Multilevel network games
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Publication:2937006
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36zbMATH Open1404.91039arXiv1409.5383OpenAlexW200577135MaRDI QIDQ2937006FDOQ2937006
Authors: Sebastian Abshoff, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, Alexander Skopalik
Publication date: 7 January 2015
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improve their communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network. The nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goal of a node is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from to all other nodes plus a fixed price if it decides to be a gateway. Between gateways the communication distance is , and gateways also improve other nodes' distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we show that for , the price of anarchy is and in this range equilibria always exist. In range the price of anarchy is , and for it is constant. For the MAX-game, we show that the price of anarchy is either , for , or else . Given a graph with girth of at least , equilibria always exist. Concerning the dynamics, both the SUM-game and the MAX-game are not potential games. For the SUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.5383
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