A three-dimensional voting system in Hong Kong
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Publication:299898
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.01.020zbMATH Open1338.91045arXiv1401.4795OpenAlexW1973056787MaRDI QIDQ299898FDOQ299898
Authors: Wai-Shun Cheung, Tuen Wai Ng 
Publication date: 23 June 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: The voting system in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (Legco) is sometimes unicameral and sometimes bicameral, depending on whether the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government. Therefore, although without any representative within Legco, the Hong Kong government has certain degree of legislative power --- as if there is a virtual representative of the Hong Kong government within the Legco. By introducing such a virtual representative of the Hong Kong government, we show that Legco is a three-dimensional voting system. We also calculate two power indices of the Hong Kong government through this virtual representative and consider the -dimension and the -dimension of Legco. Finally, some implications of this Legco model to the current constitutional reform in Hong Kong will be given.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.4795
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Cited In (5)
- On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables
- Dynamic programming algorithms for computing power indices in weighted multi-tier games
- Weighted committee games
- Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world record
- On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games
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