A three-dimensional voting system in Hong Kong

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.01.020MaRDI QIDQ299898zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wai-Shun Cheung, Tuen Wai Ng

Publication date 23 June 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.4795

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydimensionpower indicesreal voting system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Abstract: The voting system in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (Legco) is sometimes unicameral and sometimes bicameral, depending on whether the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government. Therefore, although without any representative within Legco, the Hong Kong government has certain degree of legislative power --- as if there is a virtual representative of the Hong Kong government within the Legco. By introducing such a virtual representative of the Hong Kong government, we show that Legco is a three-dimensional voting system. We also calculate two power indices of the Hong Kong government through this virtual representative and consider the $C$-dimension and the $W$-dimension of Legco. Finally, some implications of this Legco model to the current constitutional reform in Hong Kong will be given.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(5)

• On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables
• Dynamic programming algorithms for computing power indices in weighted multi-tier games
• Weighted committee games
• Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world record
• On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games

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