Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9540-5zbMATH Open1378.91016OpenAlexW2281694507MaRDI QIDQ333483FDOQ333483

Authors: Pedro Gadea-Blanco, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, M. Carmen Marco-Gil 

Publication date: 31 October 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9540-5

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamenucleolusShapley valueaxiomatic analysisdistribution problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
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• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
• Cores of exact games. I
• Transversality of the Shapley value
• A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value
• EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS

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