Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9540-5MaRDI QIDQ333483zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pedro Gadea-Blanco, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, M. Carmen Marco-Gil

Publication date 31 October 2016

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9540-5

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamenucleolusShapley valueaxiomatic analysisdistribution problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Cores of exact games. I
• EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value
• Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Transversality of the Shapley value

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