A new problem with mixed decisions, or: you'll regret reading this article, but you still should

DOI10.1007/S10670-015-9743-0zbMATH Open1348.03010OpenAlexW2204421796MaRDI QIDQ334855FDOQ334855

Authors: Benjamin Plommer 

Publication date: 1 November 2016

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9743-0

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zbMATH Keywords

decision theoryexpected utilityregretcausal decision theorydecision instabilitydynamics of deliberationratifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
• Regret and instability in causal decision theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The fundamental group of a locally finite graph with ends

Cited In (8)

• The faulty signal problem: counterfactual asymmetries in causal decision theory and rational deliberation
• Are Newcomb problems really decisions?
• On the normative status of mixed strategies
• Metatickles and Death in Damascus
• Regret and instability in causal decision theory
• Tournament decision theory
• Reversing 30~years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box
• Egan and agents: how evidential decision theory can deal with Egan's dilemma

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