Cooperation in changing environments: irreversibility in the transition to cooperation in complex networks

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2013.08.008MaRDI QIDQ336296zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Carlos Gracia-Lázaro, Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, Yamir Moreno, Luis Floría

Publication date 10 November 2016

Published in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1133

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaErdős-Rényi graphsBarabási-Albert graphs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Abstract: In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the "temptation to defect"). Under the "discrete replicator" strategy updating rule, for both Erdos-Renyi and Barabasi-Albert graphs we observe cooperation hysteresis cycles provided one reaches tipping point values of the parameter; otherwise, perfect reversibility is obtained. The selective fixation of cooperation at certain nodes and its organization in cooperator clusters, that are surrounded by fluctuating strategists, allows the rationalization of the "lagging behind" behavior observed.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5543872 (Why is no real title available?)
• Complex networks: structure and dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Natural selection of cooperation and degree hierarchy in heterogeneous populations
• Statistical mechanics of complex networks
• The Structure and Function of Complex Networks
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(5)

• Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice
• Social pressure and environmental effects on networks: a path to cooperation
• Comprehensive consideration of strategy updating promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Finite-time synchronization and identification of complex delayed networks with Markovian jumping parameters and stochastic perturbations
• Dynamical Reconfiguration of Cooperation Structure by Interaction Network

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