Cooperation in changing environments: irreversibility in the transition to cooperation in complex networks

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Publication:336296

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2013.08.008zbMATH Open1348.91072arXiv1308.1133OpenAlexW1986840174WikidataQ61965341 ScholiaQ61965341MaRDI QIDQ336296FDOQ336296

Luis Floría, Yamir Moreno, Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro

Publication date: 10 November 2016

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the "temptation to defect"). Under the "discrete replicator" strategy updating rule, for both Erdos-Renyi and Barabasi-Albert graphs we observe cooperation hysteresis cycles provided one reaches tipping point values of the parameter; otherwise, perfect reversibility is obtained. The selective fixation of cooperation at certain nodes and its organization in cooperator clusters, that are surrounded by fluctuating strategists, allows the rationalization of the "lagging behind" behavior observed.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.1133




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