When can limited randomness be used in repeated games?
DOI10.1007/s00224-016-9690-4zbMath1356.91010arXiv1507.01191OpenAlexW782722446MaRDI QIDQ506541
Pavel Hubáček, Moni Naor, Jonathan R. Ullman
Publication date: 1 February 2017
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.01191
entropygame theorycryptographyNash equilibriumrepeated gamespseudorandom generatorsone-way functionsfinitely repeated gameslimited randomness
Noncooperative games (91A10) Random number generation in numerical analysis (65C10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
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