Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference
From MaRDI portal
Publication:382990
DOI10.1007/S11229-011-9997-2zbMATH Open1275.03038OpenAlexW1996640292MaRDI QIDQ382990FDOQ382990
Authors: David Makinson 
Publication date: 25 November 2013
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38778/1/Makinson_Logical-questions-behind-the-lottery-and-preface-paradoxes_2012.pdf
Recommendations
- The lottery: A paradox regained and resolved
- Ultralarge lotteries: analyzing the lottery paradox using non-standard analysis
- Lotteries and justification
- A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
- Liars, lotteries, and prefaces: two paraconsistent accounts of belief change
Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)
Cites Work
- Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The logic of conditionals. An application of probability to deductive logic
- On the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals and conditional probabilities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficient reasoning about rich temporal domains
- Four probability-preserving properties of inferences
- The quantitative/qualitative watershed for rules of uncertain inference
- O IS NOT ENOUGH
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Probabilistic conditionals are almost monotonic
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (13)
- Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence
- Rational acceptance and conjunctive/disjunctive absorption
- Lossy inference rules and their bounds: a brief review
- Towards a Bayesian theory of second-order uncertainty: lessons from non-standard logics
- The logic of risky knowledge, reprised
- Conditional probability in the light of qualitative belief change
- Liars, lotteries, and prefaces: two paraconsistent accounts of belief change
- Preferential semantics using non-smooth preference relations
- A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
- When adjunction fails
- The lottery: A paradox regained and resolved
- A way out of the Preface Paradox?
- Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose
This page was built for publication: Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q382990)
