Firm's tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection

DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0306-4zbMATH Open1294.91140OpenAlexW2013731255MaRDI QIDQ403767FDOQ403767

Authors: Rongili Biswas, Carla Marchese, Fabio Privileggi 

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/136098

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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversiontax evasionagencyfirm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Firm's tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection

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