Firm's tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection

DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0306-4MaRDI QIDQ403767zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rongili Biswas, Carla Marchese, Fabio Privileggi

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2318/136098

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversiontax evasionagencyfirm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• Firm's tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection

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