Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage games*

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1996.9990182MaRDI QIDQ4353460zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeroen Weesie, Werner Raub

Publication date 11 September 1997

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1996.9990182

zbMATH Keywords

hostage posting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• Non-cooperative games
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The evolution of cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(1)

• How to convince someone that you can be trusted? The role of ‘hostages’

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