scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1092439
This volume is a sequel to the author's book: Realism in mathematics (Clarendon Press, Oxford) (1990; Zbl 0762.00001), and develops ideas that have appeared in a long series of recent articles. It is an ambitious attempt to defend a substantive claim in set theory \((V=L\) should not be added as an axiom to ZFC) on the basis of considerations drawn from the author's philosophy of mathematics. Part I provides the necessary set-theoretic background to understand the issues from a mathematical point of view. The presentation is clear and concise. On its own, this section would be useful to someone interested in issues in set theory. The presentation is historically informed and comprehensive. Part II develops the author's critique of realism. She considers versions based on Gödel and Quine as well as an improved version the author calls ``set-theoretic realism which is claimed to have the strengths of the two previous theories without the weaknesses of either. This version tends to assimilate mathematical and scientific practice. Maddy finally rejects this version of realism because of differences she observes between the actual practice of mathematicians and natural scientists. Part III defines the alternative of naturalism. The view is similar to Quine's except that it ``extends the same respect to mathematical practice that the Quinian naturalist extends to scientific practice. It sees mathematics as not answerable to any extra-mathematical tribunal. Two goals are drawn from an examination of mathematical practice. One goal is UNIFY. The goal is to find a single system in which all objects and structures of mathematics can be modeled or instantiated. Another goal is MAXIMIZE. The set-theoretic arena in which mathematics is modeled should be as generous as possible. Various versions of both goals are considered. Finally, the two views are used to argue that \(V=L\) should not be added to ZFC.
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