scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1092439
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4367597
Recommendations
Cited in
(85)- On three arguments against categorical structuralism
- Against naturalized cognitive propositions
- Mirror symmetry and other miracles in superstring theory
- Philosophical pictures about mathematics: Wittgenstein and contradiction
- Infinitesimal idealization, easy road nominalism, and fractional quantum statistics
- A metasemantic challenge for mathematical determinacy
- Can we resolve the continuum hypothesis?
- Dispensability in the indispensability argument
- Inference to the best explanation and mathematical realism
- Quine, Putnam, and the `Quine-Putnam' indispensability argument
- Why inference to the best explanation doesn't secure empirical grounds for mathematical Platonism
- Conclusive reasons that we perceive sets
- A SECOND PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC
- V = L and intuitive plausibility in set theory. A case study
- On arbitrary sets and ZFC
- Multiverse conceptions in set theory
- Gödel's cantorianism
- Objectivity and truth in mathematics: a sober non-Platonist perspective
- Mathematical Existence
- Second philosophy. A naturalistic method
- How applied mathematics became pure
- 2008 Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic
- Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50930 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mathematical, Astrological, and Theological Naturalism
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1136105 (Why is no real title available?)
- A First Glance at Non-Restrictiveness
- Proving Things About the Informal
- Naturalism and Ontology
- Set theoretic naturalism
- Scientific realism and the indispensability argument for mathematical realism: a marriage made in hell
- Pluralism and ``bad mathematical theories: challenging our prejudices
- Semantics and completeness for schematic logic
- Multiverse conceptions in set theory
- On the naturalness of new axioms in set theory
- Should scientific realists be Platonists?
- The varieties of indispensability arguments
- Defending Maddy's mathematical naturalism from Roland's criticisms: the role of mathematical depth
- Naturalness in mathematics
- Predicativity and Feferman
- Wigner's puzzle for mathematical naturalism
- Set-theoretic foundations
- Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not
- Naturalism in Mathematics and the Authority of Philosophy
- Restrictiveness relative to notions of interpretation
- Does mathematics need new axioms?
- In memoriam: Kenneth Jon Barwise, 1942--2000
- The search for new axioms in the hyperuniverse programme
- The search for new axioms in the hyperuniverse programme
- Some naturalistic reflections on set theoretic method
- Objectivity over objects: A case study in theory formation
- Maddy On The Multiverse
- What Do We Want a Foundation to Do?
- Hierarchical multiverse of sets
- WHAT IS A RESTRICTIVE THEORY?
- Set-theoretic justification and the theoretical virtues
- Intellectual humility in mathematics
- Unrealistic models for realistic computations: how idealisations help represent mathematical structures and found scientific computing
- Platonism and the Proto-ontology of Mathematics: Learning from the Axiom of Choice
- Dirac and the dispensability of mathematics
- Mathematical pull
- Mathematical explanations in evolutionary biology or naturalism? A challenge for the statisticalist
- The practice of mathematics: cognitive resources and conceptual content
- No magic: from phenomenology of practice to social ontology of mathematics
- The explanatory and heuristic power of mathematics. Introduction to a topical collection in Synthese
- Of sheep and wolves: equivalence and disagreement in set theory
- The pragmatism of Hilbert's programme
- Maximality principles in the hyperuniverse programme
- Is there a fact of the matter about the existence of abstract objects?
- Description, explanation and ontological committment
- Book review of: S. Centrone (ed.) et al., Reflections on the foundations of mathematics. Univalent foundations, set theory and general thoughts
- Why the quantum?
- Models as fundamental entities in set theory: a naturalistic and practice-based approach
- On logical and scientific strength
- Wittgenstein on Cantor's proof
- Arealism, thin realism, and the problem of extrinsic evidence
- The hidden use of new axioms
- The iterative notion of function and the iterative notion of set
- What set theory could not be about
- Language, models, and reality: weak existence and a threefold correspondence
- Mathematics and conceptual analysis
- Towards a new epistemology of mathematics
- The role of axioms in mathematics
- Too naturalist and not naturalist enough: Reply to Horsten
- What anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics must offer
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4367597)
