A characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in Borel games of perfect information
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Publication:4595960
DOI10.1287/MOOR.2016.0843zbMATH Open1376.91030OpenAlexW2619738330MaRDI QIDQ4595960FDOQ4595960
Arkadi Predtetchinski, János Flesch
Publication date: 7 December 2017
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/35726191/Flesch_2017_Characterization_of_Subgame_Perfect.pdf
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- Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games
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- Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version)
- On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
- Quantitative reachability Stackelberg-Pareto synthesis is \textsf{NEXPTIME}-complete
- Perfect information games where each player acts only once
- Stochastic Games
- On the Existence of Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria
- Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
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