Bilateral information sharing and pricing incentives in a retail channel

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32441-8_16MaRDI QIDQ4596554zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anthony Dukes, Esther Gal-Or, Tansev Geylani

Publication date 1 December 2017

Published in Springer Series in Supply Chain Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32441-8_16

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Economics of information (91B44)

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(11)

• Should a manufacturer give up pricing power in a vertical information-sharing channel?
• Multi-sourcing and information sharing under competition and supply uncertainty
• Bilateral information sharing in a supply chain with manufacturer competition
• The impact of manufacturer's encroachment and nonlinear production cost on retailer's information sharing decisions
• Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?
• Sharing Demand Information Under Simple Wholesale Pricing
• Agency selling or reselling: e-tailer information sharing with supplier offline entry
• Friction in related-party trade when a rival is also a customer
• Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts
• When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?
• Information sharing when competing manufacturers adopt asymmetric channel in an e-tailer

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