Improving the H_k-bound on the price of stability in undirected Shapley network design games
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2014.10.037zbMATH Open1303.91056OpenAlexW2027154380MaRDI QIDQ476904FDOQ476904
Authors: Andreas Emil Feldmann, Max Klimm, Y. Disser, Matúš Mihalák 
Publication date: 2 December 2014
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2014.10.037
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- Improving the \(H _{k }\)-bound on the price of stability in undirected Shapley network design games
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- An \(H _{n/2}\) upper bound on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
price of stabilitypotential-optimal price of anarchypotential-optimal price of stabilityundirected Shapley network design game
Cites Work
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Potential games
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
- Network formation games and the potential function method
- On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations
- An \(O(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})\) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- On the price of stability for undirected network design
- Nash equilibria with minimum potential in undirected broadcast games
Cited In (10)
- An \(H _{n/2}\) upper bound on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- An \(O(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})\) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- Improving the \(H _{k }\)-bound on the price of stability in undirected Shapley network design games
- Efficient black-box reductions for separable cost sharing
- Efficient black-box reductions for separable cost sharing
- A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares
- Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design game
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- Further results on capacitated network design games
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