Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design game
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Publication:1757081
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0600-zzbMath1418.91101OpenAlexW2768332442MaRDI QIDQ1757081
Simone Montemezzani, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matúš Mihalák
Publication date: 28 December 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0600-z
Nash equilibriumprice of stabilityring topologynetwork design gamepotential-optimum price of stability/anarchy
Applications of graph theory (05C90) Games involving graphs (91A43) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
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