Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner's dilemma game under incomplete and complete information
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Publication:4963371
DOI10.1080/0022250X.2016.1226301zbMATH Open1417.91081OpenAlexW2521597589MaRDI QIDQ4963371FDOQ4963371
Authors: Jacob Dijkstra, Marcel van Assen 
Publication date: 2 November 2018
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2016.1226301
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Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- A theory of reciprocity
- The evolution of cooperation
- A Theory of Status-Mediated Inequity Aversion
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Interactive preferences
- Social motives and expectations in one-shot asymmetric prisoner's dilemmas
Cited In (14)
- Group extinction in iterated two person games with evolved group-level mixed strategies
- A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY
- Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
- A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- On learning to cooperate.
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Patience or fairness? Analyzing social preferences in repeated games
- Surrounding information consideration promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
- An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma
- Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
- Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- A choice for `me' or for `us'? Using we-reasoning to predict cooperation and coordination in games
- A study of prisoner's dilemma game model with incomplete information
- Theory of mind predicts cooperative behavior
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