Commitment in Organizations and the Competition for Talent

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA008zbMATH Open1504.91143OpenAlexW3008417963MaRDI QIDQ5049136FDOQ5049136

Authors: Thomas F. Cooley, Ramon Marimon 

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa008

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zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmentdirected searchdynamic contractspartnershipsorganizational structurepublic companies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cited In (4)

• Diverse organizations and the competition for talent
• A theory of national development bank: long-term investment and the agency problem
• A generalized model of commitment
• Optimal regulation of noncompete contracts

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