When is Selfish Routing Bad? The Price of Anarchy in Light and Heavy Traffic

DOI10.1287/opre.2019.1894zbMath1446.90051arXiv1703.00927OpenAlexW3009885343MaRDI QIDQ5131466

Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Marco Scarsini, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Roberto Cominetti

Publication date: 8 November 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.00927

zbMATH Keywords

regular variationheavy trafficlight trafficprice of anarchynonatomic congestion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Potential and congestion games (91A14)

Related Items (6)

Robust perfect equilibrium in large games ⋮ A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games ⋮ Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand ⋮ Analytical formulation for explaining the variations in traffic states: a fundamental diagram modeling perspective with stochastic parameters ⋮ The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand ⋮ Selfishness Need Not Be Bad

Cites Work

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• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Regularly varying functions
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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