A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists
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Abstract: In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been argued that so-called "halfers" can avoid Dutch book arguments by adopting evidential decision theory. I introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall prey to it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The argument crucially requires that an action can provide evidence for what the agent would do not only at other decision points where she has exactly the same information, but also at decision points where she has different but "symmetric" information.
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Cites work
Cited in
(9)- The vulnerability of the transferable belief model to Dutch books
- Hidden assumptions in the Dutch Book argument
- Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan
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- Bayesian beauty
- Can rational choice guide us to correct \textit{de se} beliefs?
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