DEMONSTRATING WORKER QUALITY THROUGH STRATEGIC ABSENTEEISM

DOI10.1142/S021919890500048XMaRDI QIDQ5692579zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Anne van den Nouweland, W. T. Harbaugh

Publication date 28 September 2005

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

signalingnon-cooperative gamesteamworkabsenteeism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
• The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
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• Optimal Contracts for Teams

Cites work

• Sequential Equilibria

Cited in

(1)

• The impact of turnout on turning up: the complementarity of attendance among co-workers

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