Tight bounds for the price of anarchy and stability in sequential transportation games

DOI10.1007/s10878-023-01073-yarXiv2007.08726OpenAlexW3043342004MaRDI QIDQ6053961

Francisco J. M. da Silva, Ieremies V. F. Romero, Flávio K. Miyazawa, Rafael C. S. Schouery

Publication date: 27 September 2023

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.08726

zbMATH Keywords

transportationsubgame perfect equilibriumprice of anarchyprice of stabilitysequential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Worst-case equilibria
• Sequential scheduling on identical machines
• The curse of simultaneity
• Some Anomalies of Farsighted Strategic Behavior
• The Price of Anarchy for Minsum Related Machine Scheduling
• The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Atomic Congestion Games
• Selfish Transportation Games
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Multiagent Systems
• Decentralized Throughput Scheduling
• On the Sequential Price of Anarchy of Isolation Games
• The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Tight bounds for the price of anarchy and stability in sequential transportation games