Strategic limitation of market accessibility: search platform design and welfare

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105798MaRDI QIDQ6203355FDOQ6203355

Authors: Christopher Teh, Chengsi Wang, Makoto S. Watanabe 

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

accessibilitysearchplatformintermediationmeeting technology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
• Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Information
• Strategic advertising and directed search
• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

Cited In (1)

• Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets

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