Independent postulates for subjective expected utility
The paper is a contribution to the theory of subjective expected utility. The introductory part is a survey of the development of the theory since the first papers by \textit{L. J. Savage} [The foundations of statistics. Wiley Publications in Statistics. New York: John Wiley \& Sons, Inc (1954; Zbl 0055.12604)] and \textit{P. C. Fishburn} [Utility theory for decision making. Publications in Operations Research. No. 18; New York etc.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (1970; Zbl 0213.46202)] to the present days. The authors formulate seven postulates of subjective expected utility theory by Fishburn [loc. cit.]. The main result of the paper is a proof that only six of the postulates (namely Postulates 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 in the text of the paper) are independent, while Postulate 3 is implied by them. Some directions of further research in this area are briefly outlined in the concluding section of the paper.
- Do bets reveal beliefs? A unified perspective on state-dependent utility issues
- Erratum to: ``Savage's P3 is redundant
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- Savage for dummies and experts
- Savage's Axioms Usually Imply Violation of Strict Stochastic Dominance
- Savage's P3 is redundant
- Spatial multi-attribute decision analysis: axiomatic foundations and incomplete preference information
- Using Finitely Additive Probability: Uniform Distributions on the Natural Numbers
This page was built for publication: Independent postulates for subjective expected utility
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6540651)
