Ambiguity aversion, risk aversion, and the weight of evidence
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Publication:6640945
DOI10.1007/S11238-024-09995-7MaRDI QIDQ6640945FDOQ6640945
Authors: Edi Karni 
Publication date: 20 November 2024
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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