On strong independence of allocative efficiency from distribution in the theory of public goods

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.04.004MaRDI QIDQ694897zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman L. Kleinberg, Barry Ma, Jeffrey Weiss

Publication date 19 December 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyindependenceincome distributionpublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• A note on the fundamental theorem of exact aggregation
• Community Preference Fields
• Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer
• Completeness, Distribution Restrictions, and the Form of Aggregate Functions
• Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods

Cited in

(5)

• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
• On the origin of the WTA-WTP divergence in public good valuation
• Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests
• Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods

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