On strong independence of allocative efficiency from distribution in the theory of public goods

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.04.004zbMATH Open1253.91069OpenAlexW2001036412MaRDI QIDQ694897FDOQ694897

Authors: Norman L. Kleinberg, Barry Ma, Jeffrey Weiss 

Publication date: 19 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.004

Recommendations

• A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies
• A theorem on utilitarian redistribution
• On the set of Pareto efficient allocations in economies with public goods
• An Extension of the Second Welfare Theorem to Economies with Nonconvexities and Public Goods
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyindependenceincome distributionpublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Community Preference Fields
• Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer
• A note on the fundamental theorem of exact aggregation
• Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods
• Completeness, Distribution Restrictions, and the Form of Aggregate Functions

Cited In (5)

• Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests
• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
• On the origin of the WTA-WTP divergence in public good valuation

This page was built for publication: On strong independence of allocative efficiency from distribution in the theory of public goods

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q694897)