When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109225zbMATH Open1442.91037OpenAlexW3028262716MaRDI QIDQ777740FDOQ777740

Authors: Artyom Jelnov, Doron Klunover 

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109225

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zbMATH Keywords

conflictcontestpublic good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume I: Theory

Cited In (3)

• Inequality and conflict outbreak
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• On the social efficiency of conflict

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