When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109225MaRDI QIDQ777740zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Artyom Jelnov, Doron Klunover

Publication date 7 July 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109225

zbMATH Keywords

conflictcontestpublic good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
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Cites work

• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume I: Theory
• Strategy and dynamics in contests

Cited in

(3)

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Inequality and conflict outbreak
• On the social efficiency of conflict

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