The logic of ability, freedom and responsibility
The authors apply transparent intensional logic (t.i.l.) to explicating most sophisticated notions concerning ability of agents to do something. The apparatus of t.i.l. (based on partial theory of types supported by a transparent modification of the typed \(\lambda\)-calculus) makes it possible to define a great many of auxiliary concepts, which in turn enable us to analyse the meanings of the verb can, and to make clear the notions of opportunity, ability, freedom and responsibility, that have been up to now explained mostly in philosophical terms. The definitions are rigorous, the verbal statements (some of them not just trivial) are derivable with respect to the rules of derivation adduced in the paper. A popular version of the paper has appeared in Am. Philos. Quart. 20, No.2, 135-146 (1983) under the title: Ability and freedom.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1537945 (Why is no real title available?)
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