Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry
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Publication:825078
DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09822-3zbMATH Open1479.91195OpenAlexW3163880258MaRDI QIDQ825078FDOQ825078
Authors: Jianxia Yang, Chenhang Zeng 
Publication date: 17 December 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09822-3
Recommendations
- Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
- Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly
- Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions
- Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence
- Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization
- Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence
- Interlocking cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly: when social welfare benefits from ``more collusion
- Can partial horizontal ownership lessen competition more than a monopoly?
- Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
Cited In (10)
- Cross-ownership: a device for management entrenchment?
- Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
- Shareholding interlocks: profit formulations and cartelizing effects
- Cross ownership and divestment incentives
- The effects of optimal cross holding in an asymmetric oligopoly
- Cross-ownership and managerial delegation under vertical product differentiation
- Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly
- Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination
- Passive cross-holdings, horizontal differentiation, and welfare
- Can cross-holdings benefit consumers?
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