Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader

DOI10.1134/S0005117920070073zbMath1455.91146OpenAlexW3080808459MaRDI QIDQ828099

G. I. Algazin, D. G. Algazina

Publication date: 14 January 2021

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117920070073

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibriumcompetitivenessconvergence conditionsGross profitabilityrefinement of outputsreflexive collective behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (7)

To the analytical investigation of the convergence conditions of the processes of reflexive collective behavior in oligopoly models ⋮ Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents ⋮ Coordination of collective actions by using the Stackelberg strategy ⋮ The interaction of economic agents in Cournot duopoly models under ecological conditions: a comparison of organizational modes ⋮ A survey of the latest advances in oligopoly games ⋮ Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model ⋮ Analysis of equilibria in a nonlinear oligopoly model

Cites Work

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• Non-cooperative games
• Market Structure and Equilibrium
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
• Study of unsteady oligopoly markets

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