Reflexion processes and equilibrium in an oligopoly model with a leader

DOI10.1134/S0005117920070073zbMATH Open1455.91146OpenAlexW3080808459MaRDI QIDQ828099FDOQ828099

Authors: G. I. Algazin, D. G. Algazina 

Publication date: 14 January 2021

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117920070073

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zbMATH Keywords

competitivenessconvergence conditionsStackelberg equilibriumGross profitabilityrefinement of outputsreflexive collective behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
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• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
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• Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information
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• Analysis of game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market under constrains on the capacity and competitiveness of agents
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• Study of unsteady oligopoly markets
• Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty

Cited In (13)

• Differential game-theoretic models of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of the green effect
• Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty
• Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Analysis of equilibria in a nonlinear oligopoly model
• The interaction of economic agents in Cournot duopoly models under ecological conditions: a comparison of organizational modes
• To the analytical investigation of the convergence conditions of the processes of reflexive collective behavior in oligopoly models
• Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents
• A survey of the latest advances in oligopoly games
• Influence of reflexion on the properties of equilibria in a nonlinear Stackelberg oligopoly model
• Convergence conditions for the dynamics of reflexive collective behavior in a Cournot oligopoly model under incomplete information
• Coordination of collective actions by using the Stackelberg strategy
• Aggregate estimates of reflexive collective behavior dynamics in a Cournot oligopoly model

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