Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844666
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.010zbMath1181.91158MaRDI QIDQ844666
Leslie Shiell, Nikita Lyssenko
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sciencessociales.uottawa.ca/economics/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca.economics/files/0409E.pdf
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91A25: Dynamic games
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B55: Economic dynamics
Related Items
Cites Work
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
- Dynamic noncooperative game theory
- ENTICE: endogenous technological change in the DICE model of global warming
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- Community Preference Fields