Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.06.010zbMATH Open1181.91158OpenAlexW1992582069MaRDI QIDQ844666FDOQ844666
Authors: Leslie Shiell, Nikita Lyssenko 
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sciencessociales.uottawa.ca/economics/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca.economics/files/0409E.pdf
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Cites Work
- Dynamic noncooperative game theory
- Community Preference Fields
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
- ENTICE: endogenous technological change in the DICE model of global warming
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
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