Private information, transferable utility, and the core

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0416-yzbMath1182.91078OpenAlexW2245451439MaRDI QIDQ847871

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Sjur Didrik Flåm

Publication date: 19 February 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ekstern.filer.uib.no/svf/2007/NO.%2004-07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

differential informationcorevalue of informationcooperative gameexchange economytransferable utilityLagrangian duality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Multicoalitional solutions ⋮ A topological invariant for competetive markets ⋮ Coupled projects, core imputations, and the CAPM ⋮ DIRECT EXCHANGE IN LINEAR ECONOMIES ⋮ Gradient differences and bilateral barters ⋮ Bilateral exchange and competitive equilibrium

Cites Work

• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• A note on Gale's example
• The not-quite non-atomic game: non-emptiness of the core in large production games
• Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information
• On the core of linear production games
• Estimates of the Duality Gap in Nonconvex Optimization
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Convex Analysis
• Differential information economies: Introduction
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
• Sharing nonconvex costs
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• Unnamed Item

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