Private information, transferable utility, and the core

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0416-YMaRDI QIDQ847871zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sjur Didrik Flåm, Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Publication date 19 February 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ekstern.filer.uib.no/svf/2007/NO.%2004-07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamecoretransferable utilityvalue of informationLagrangian dualityexchange economydifferential information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072559 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3327459 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on Gale's example
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
• Convex Analysis
• Differential information economies: Introduction
• Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information
• Estimates of the Duality Gap in Nonconvex Optimization
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• On the core of linear production games
• Sharing nonconvex costs
• The core of an economy with differential information
• The not-quite non-atomic game: non-emptiness of the core in large production games

Cited in

(8)

• Bilateral exchange and competitive equilibrium
• Gradient differences and bilateral barters
• Coupled projects, core imputations, and the CAPM
• A topological invariant for competetive markets
• Multicoalitional solutions
• Direct exchange in linear economies
• Symmetrical core and Shapley value of an information transferal game
• Private information and the `Information function': A survey of possible uses

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