Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
From MaRDI portal
Publication:895153
DOI10.1007/S10598-013-9210-1zbMath1326.91006OpenAlexW1989952853MaRDI QIDQ895153
Publication date: 26 November 2015
Published in: Computational Mathematics and Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10598-013-9210-1
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)
Related Items (7)
Simulation Modeling of the Resource Allocation Under Economic Corruption ⋮ Mathematical modeling and optimal control of corruption dynamics ⋮ Mathematical modeling, analysis, and optimal control of corruption dynamics ⋮ Mean-field-game model of corruption ⋮ A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game ⋮ Evolutionary inspection and corruption games ⋮ Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
