Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level

DOI10.1007/S10598-013-9210-1MaRDI QIDQ895153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. V. Nikolaev

Publication date 26 November 2015

Published in Computational Mathematics and Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10598-013-9210-1

zbMATH Keywords

audithierarchical structurecorruptionRussiagame-theoretical models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cites work

• Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy
• Models of state inspections organizations and struggle against corruptions

Cited in

(9)

• Mathematical modeling and optimal control of corruption dynamics
• Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
• Simulation modeling of the resource allocation under economic corruption
• Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
• A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game
• Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
• Mathematical modeling, analysis, and optimal control of corruption dynamics
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service

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