Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2005.05.009MaRDI QIDQ959652zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, A. Lans Bovenberg

Publication date 12 December 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

targetscommitmentdiscretionpublic debtcentral bank conservatismpolitical shocks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Central bank independence and public debt policy
• A CENTRAL BANK FOR ALL SEASONS? THE LOWER INFLATION AT NO COST PROPOSITION UNDER CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
• Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output
• Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy
• The determination of public debt under both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty

Cites work

• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY
• Fiscal rules in a monetary union: A short-run analysis
• Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game
• Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy

Cited in

(3)

• Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?
• Populism, political pressure and central bank (in)dependence
• A CENTRAL BANK FOR ALL SEASONS? THE LOWER INFLATION AT NO COST PROPOSITION UNDER CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY

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