Random evolutionarily stable strategies

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(78)90047-3MaRDI QIDQ1245183zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors John Guckenheimer, George F. Oster, D. M. Auslander

Publication date 1978

Published in Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(78)90047-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Cites work

• Competition between phenotypes
• Differentiable dynamical systems
• Equilibrium states and the ergodic theory of Anosov diffeomorphisms
• On the nature of turbulence
• Period Three Implies Chaos
• Phenotypic structure and bifurcation behavior of population models
• The dynamics of density dependent population models
• The logic of animal conflict
• The qualitative analysis of a difference equation of population growth

Cited in

(14)

• \(G\)-functions for the hermeneutic circle of evolution
• The ideal free distribution: a review and synthesis of the game-theoretic perspective
• The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
• Competition, kin selection, and evolutionary stable strategies
• Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
• Evolutionary games
• Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics
• Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
• Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
• A theory for the evolutionary game
• Worker-Queen conflict and the evolution of social insects
• A report on evolutionarily stable strategy: Modelling the effects of behaviour on evolution
• Regular and chaotic cycling in models of ecological genetics
• Stability in an evolutionary game

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