Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2004.00300.XMaRDI QIDQ4664523zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philip Bond, Arvind Krishnamurthy

Publication date 5 April 2005

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00300.x

zbMATH Keywords

debtoptimal enforcementrobust

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(7)

• Endogenous credit limits with small default costs
• The optimal exclusion length of borrowers after default
• Education and growth with endogenous debt constraints
• Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
• A Welfare Analysis of Regulation in Relationship Banking Markets
• Regulating household leverage
• The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets

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