Relaxing Integrity Requirements for Attack-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

DOI10.1109/TAC.2019.2898510MaRDI QIDQ5211254zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ilija Jovanov, Miroslav Pajic

Publication date 28 January 2020

Published in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.02950

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Filtering in stochastic control theory (93E11) Detection theory in information and communication theory (94A13)

Abstract: The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor measurements delivered to the controller. Recent results have shown that with network-based attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle attacks, the attacker can introduce an unbounded state estimation error if measurements from a suitable subset of sensors contain false data when delivered to the controller. While these attacks can be addressed with the standard cryptographic tools that ensure data integrity, their continuous use would introduce significant communication and computation overhead. Consequently, we study effects of intermittent data integrity guarantees on system performance under stealthy attacks. We consider linear estimators equipped with a general type of residual-based intrusion detectors (including $ch{i}^2$ and SPRT detectors), and show that even when integrity of sensor measurements is enforced only intermittently, the attack impact is significantly limited; specifically, the state estimation error is bounded or the attacker cannot remain stealthy. Furthermore, we present methods to: (1) evaluate the effects of any given integrity enforcement policy in terms of reachable state-estimation errors for any type of stealthy attacks, and (2) design an enforcement policy that provides the desired estimation error guarantees under attack. Finally, on three automotive case studies we show that even with less than 10% of authenticated messages we can ensure satisfiable control performance in the presence of attacks.

Cited in

(10)

• On attack detection and identification for the cyber-physical system using lifted system model
• Attack-resilient state estimation with intermittent data authentication
• Vulnerability analysis for a class of nonlinear cyber-physical systems under stealthy attacks
• Sliding mode-based adaptive resilient control for Markovian jump cyber-physical systems in face of simultaneous actuator and sensor attacks
• Resilient time‐varying formation tracking for mobile robot networks under deception attacks on positioning
• Sparse attack reconstruction for cyber-physical systems via descriptor reduced-order observer
• Single-dimensional encryption against innovation-based stealthy attacks on remote state estimation
• Secure state estimation for cyber-physical systems under sparse data injection attacks: a switched counteraction approach
• Learning-based actuator selection for increased attack resilience of uncertain systems
• A stealthy man-in-the-middle attack strategy for switched systems

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