Attack-resilient state estimation with intermittent data authentication
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Publication:2123199
Abstract: Network-based attacks on control systems may alter sensor data delivered to the controller, effectively causing degradation in control performance. As a result, having access to accurate state estimates, even in the presence of attacks on sensor measurements, is of critical importance. In this paper, we analyze performance of resilient state estimators (RSEs) when any subset of sensors may be compromised by a stealthy attacker. Specifically, we consider systems with the well-known l0-based RSE and two commonly used sound intrusion detectors (IDs). For linear time-invariant plants with bounded noise, we define the notion of perfect attackability (PA) when attacks may result in unbounded estimation errors while remaining undetected by the employed ID (i.e., stealthy). We derive necessary and sufficient PA conditions, showing that a system can be perfectly attackable even if the plant is stable. While PA can be prevented with the use the standard cryptographic mechanisms (e.g.,message authentication) that ensure data integrity under network-based attacks, their continuous use imposes significant communication and computational overhead. Consequently, we also study the impact that even intermittent use of data authentication has on RSE performance guarantees in the presence of stealthy attacks. We show that if messages from some of the sensors are even intermittently authenticated, stealthy attacks could not result in unbounded state estimation errors.
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Cites work
- A secure control framework for resource-limited adversaries
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- Attack-Resilient State Estimation for Noisy Dynamical Systems
- Covert Misappropriation of Networked Control Systems: Presenting a Feedback Structure
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Cited in
(7)- Stealthy attacks and attack-resilient interval observers
- On the confidentiality of controller states under sensor attacks
- Attack-Resilient <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal H_2$</tex-math> </inline-formula>, <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal H_\infty$</tex-math> </inline-formula>, and <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\ell _1$</tex-math> </inline-formula> State Estimator
- Testing and Defending Methods Against DOS Attack in State Estimation
- Passivity-based attack identification and mitigation via event-triggered observer feedback
- Secure distributed consensus estimation under false data injection attacks: a defense strategy based on partial channel coding
- Resilient state recovery using prior measurement support information
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