Reserve prices without commitment
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(17)- Pay-what-you-want because I do not know how much to charge you
- Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
- Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse
- Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden
- Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
- Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
- Reserve price commitments in auctions
- Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers
- In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders
- How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions
- Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
- Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- Auctions with entry
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
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