Sabotaging potential rivals

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0157-4MaRDI QIDQ866938zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Runkel, J. Atsu. Amegashie

Publication date 14 February 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1500.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
• Sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants: empirical evidence from the soccer pitch
• Rational self-sabotage
• On sabotage in collective tournaments
• When sabotage fails

Cites work

• HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(12)

• Multi-activity contests
• Sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants: empirical evidence from the soccer pitch
• A sort of an adversary
• When sabotage fails
• Dynamic multi-activity contests
• Contest with attack and defense: Does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?
• Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage
• Rational self-sabotage
• Contests with multiplicative sabotage effect
• Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
• Additive multi-effort contests

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