Search from an unknown distribution: An explicit solution
From MaRDI portal
This paper derives the optimal strategy of an agent who searches with recall from an unknown distribution and who holds Dirichlet beliefs. Providing his priors are accurate, this searcher will immediately accept an offer which would have terminated his search had he known for sure the distribution, but if unlucky he may eventually accept a lower wage. In the latter case, as he accumulates more experience, he is increasingly reluctant to do so. This paper also explains why some workers become discouraged.
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- A Bayesian analysis of some nonparametric problems
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Equilibrium Price Dispersion
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3906232 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3456236 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3246773 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3357742 (Why is no real title available?)
- Matching, search, and bargaining
- Optimal adaptive price search
- Optimal Search
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Search mechanisms
Cited in
(6)
This page was built for publication: Search from an unknown distribution: An explicit solution
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1196664)