Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.09.007MaRDI QIDQ1682711zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jason R. Marden

Publication date 5 December 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

game theorylearningnetworked control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
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• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
• Computing equilibria in multi-player games
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
• Learning by trial and error
• Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
• Payoff-based dynamics for multiplayer weakly acyclic games
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Value of information in two-team zero-sum problems

Cited in

(5)

• Learning correlated equilibria in noncooperative games with cluster structure
• Learning to play efficient coarse correlated equilibria
• Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
• A strategic learning algorithm for state-based games
• Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning

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