Selling order in a sequential auction

DOI10.1007/S40505-026-00312-9MaRDI QIDQ7294812zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hikmet Gunay, Xin Meng, Víctor E. Pérez

Publication date 13 July 2026

Published in Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S40505-026-00312-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• Probability and stochastics.
• Sequential auctions with ambiguity
• Sequential auctions with synergies: An example
• Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies
• Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions

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