Sequential claim games
The authors discuss a non-cooperative approach to the division of an estate. This kind of problem can arise in the context of bankruptcy or -- after suitable transformation -- in the context of advertising, rental of space (for exhibition), and voting, to say the least. The model for estate division is an extensive form game of perfect information. The players are ordered (by some extrinsic means, including random mechanism). On \(j\)th stage of the game, Player \(j\) observes the decisions of players from earlier stages of the game and claims a finite number of disjoint subintervals of \([0,1]\) (representing the estate) with total length corresponding to the \(j\)'s entitlement. The resulting subdivision of \([0,1]\) is further subdivided proportionally according to the entitlements on parts claimed by more than one player. The authors restrict their investigation to a myopic way of playing: claims of Player \(j\) are put on the least claimed parts of the estate. It turns out that the myopic play leads to a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous version of the claim game. However, it may not lead to a Nash equilibrium in the sequential play; it is optimal only for the last claimer. The main question is the following: how to turn a myopic strategy profile into a subgame perfect equilibrium. The main result of the article roughly states that if myopic players select the least claimed parts of \([0,1]\), scanning it from the left to the right, and they `punish' a claimer who makes `holes' when choosing subintervals, then this leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Since the estate division problem in the case of equal entitlements resembles the fair division of cake, it would be interesting to see any approach to estate division in the spirit of `I cut, you choose' procedures for multiple cake-eaters.
- A characterization of the proportional rule in multi-issue allocation situations
- A composite run-to-the-bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations
- A new rule for the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems
- A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems
- Allocation rules on networks
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Claim games for estate division problems
- Distributive justice in taxation
- Equal sacrifice taxation
- Families of sequential priority rules and random arrival rules with withdrawal limits
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation
- Multi-issue allocation situations
- Multi-issue bankruptcy problems with crossed claims
- Non-cooperative games
- Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Sequential bankruptcy problems
- The Bipartite Rationing Problem
- The dynamics of Majoritarian Blotto games
- The museum pass game and its value.
- The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels
- Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem
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