Spatial public goods games with queueing and reputation

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2025.129533MaRDI QIDQ6922155zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gui Zhang, Xiaojin Xiong, Bin Pi, Minyu Feng, Matjaž Perc

Publication date 2 October 2025

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.AMC.2025.129533

zbMATH Keywords

queueingcooperationreputationpublic goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX) Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Cites work

• A stochastic behavioral model and a `microscopic' foundation of evolutionary game theory
• Effects of social-distancing on infectious disease dynamics: an evolutionary game theory and economic perspective
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary games on the lattice: best-response dynamics
• Hawk-dove game and competition dynamics
• Inertia in spatial public goods games under weak selection
• Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game
• Stable mixing in hawk-dove games under best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Supervised cooperation on interdependent public goods games

Cited in

(5)

• The other side of the coin: recipient norms and their impact on indirect reciprocity and cooperation
• Evolutionary multigame with perception competition between conformists and imitators
• Reinforcement learning in evolutionary game theory: a brief review of recent developments
• Incentive-based control of networked evolutionary coordination games under asynchronous best-response dynamics
• Context-sensitive norm enforcement reduces sanctioning costs in spatial public goods games

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