The following pages link to (Q3901249):
Displayed 24 items.
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness (Q417640) (← links)
- The insider's curse (Q632956) (← links)
- Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules (Q800196) (← links)
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions (Q1083004) (← links)
- Structural instability of the core (Q1088925) (← links)
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications (Q1090262) (← links)
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions (Q1095771) (← links)
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions (Q1147612) (← links)
- Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting (Q1153828) (← links)
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory (Q1162428) (← links)
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium (Q1171972) (← links)
- Weakly implementable social choice rules (Q1200530) (← links)
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems (Q1300409) (← links)
- Coalition formation in games of fair division (Q1327964) (← links)
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems (Q1350573) (← links)
- A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle (Q1352217) (← links)
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude (Q1357585) (← links)
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization (Q1363085) (← links)
- A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. (Q1415908) (← links)
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy (Q1804641) (← links)
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability (Q1814807) (← links)
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria (Q1925688) (← links)
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization (Q2641198) (← links)
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria (Q5932220) (← links)