Pages that link to "Item:Q4016221"

The following pages link to Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information (Q4016221):

Displaying 50 items.

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information (Q308649) (← links)
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness (Q417640) (← links)
• Implementation with partial provability (Q449172) (← links)
• Full implementation in backward induction (Q492868) (← links)
• Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability (Q508408) (← links)
• Rationalizable implementation (Q548264) (← links)
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation (Q617583) (← links)
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms (Q632946) (← links)
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms (Q645640) (← links)
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies (Q654531) (← links)
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (Q694739) (← links)
• Introduction to experimental game theory (Q697939) (← links)
• Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison (Q697946) (← links)
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies (Q705955) (← links)
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions (Q725051) (← links)
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms (Q866939) (← links)
• Complexity and repeated implementation (Q896948) (← links)
• Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies (Q938058) (← links)
• A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions (Q972140) (← links)
• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results (Q1001138) (← links)
• Aggregation of expert opinions (Q1007768) (← links)
• Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games (Q1128553) (← links)
• Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints (Q1206350) (← links)
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments (Q1268575) (← links)
• Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions (Q1270056) (← links)
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency (Q1272620) (← links)
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games (Q1294030) (← links)
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information (Q1300208) (← links)
• Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set (Q1327071) (← links)
• Implementing coordinated team play (Q1367913) (← links)
• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation (Q1391059) (← links)
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection (Q1584555) (← links)
• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
• On run-preventing contract design (Q1675005) (← links)
• Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game (Q1680118) (← links)
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations (Q1735752) (← links)
• Implementation via rights structures (Q1757583) (← links)
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation (Q1779834) (← links)
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory (Q1934850) (← links)
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective (Q1995292) (← links)
• Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information (Q2021338) (← links)
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences (Q2031171) (← links)
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms (Q2049477) (← links)
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms (Q2058863) (← links)
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (Q2100648) (← links)
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions (Q2203494) (← links)
• Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions (Q2235090) (← links)
• Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs (Q2253833) (← links)
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? (Q2288521) (← links)
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability (Q2296029) (← links)