The following pages link to (Q4495209):
Displayed 32 items.
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models (Q284375) (← links)
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness (Q532698) (← links)
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition (Q862542) (← links)
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability (Q996393) (← links)
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions (Q997202) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains (Q1014329) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070) (← links)
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information (Q2049488) (← links)
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules (Q2128950) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations (Q2269381) (← links)
- Weighted committee games (Q2286886) (← links)
- Dictatorship versus manipulability (Q2334835) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (Q2385061) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? (Q2389767) (← links)
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056) (← links)
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule (Q2392761) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules (Q2450081) (← links)
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (Q2450082) (← links)
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities (Q2453827) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)
- On the safety of group manipulation (Q6062959) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)