Strategic communication with minimal verification

DOI10.3982/ECTA15712MaRDI QIDQ4971282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georgy Egorov, Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 12 October 2020

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15712

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkmechanism designmultidimensional informationverifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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• When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
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• Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
• The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
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