Strategy-proof voting scheme under single-peak preference

MaRDI QIDQ3517966zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Li Zhang, Jiangfeng Li, Zongqian Liu

Publication date 6 August 2008

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofsocial choice functionsingle-peak preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(5)

• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5527898 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

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