Strong stability for matrix games under time constraints
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A game-theoretic model of kleptoparasitic behavior in polymorphic populations
- A predator-prey refuge system: evolutionary stability in ecological systems
- A short course in ordinary differential equations
- A temporal model of territorial defence with antagonistic interactions
- Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
- Dynamically unstable ESS in matrix games under time constraints
- Evolutionarily stable sets
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints
- Evolutionary stability in Lotka-Volterra systems
- Evolutionary substitution and replacement in \(N\)-species Lotka-Volterra systems
- Frequency-dependent stability for two-species interactions
- Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
- Game-theoretical models in biology
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3702466 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2229941 (Why is no real title available?)
- Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two-player matrix games
- Replicator dynamics generalized for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints
- Resistance is useless? -- Extensions to the game theory of kleptoparasitism
- Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
- Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
- Stability in \(\mathcal N\)-species coevolutionary systems
- The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints
- The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics
- The logic of animal conflict
- The stochastic modelling of kleptoparasitism using a Markov process
- Three characterizations of population strategy stability
- When does the variance of replicator fitness decrease?
- When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: a model of kleptoparasitism
This page was built for publication: Strong stability for matrix games under time constraints
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6924430)