Superrational types

DOI10.1093/JIGPAL/JZZ007MaRDI QIDQ5865561zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Fernando Tohmé, Ignacio D. Viglizzo

Publication date 9 June 2022

Published in Logic Journal of the IGPL (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06888, http://hdl.handle.net/11336/92869

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamescoalgebrasstrategic belief modelssuperrationalitytypes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Abstract: We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter's concept of emph{superrationality}. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of emph{type} drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes.

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